On Bullshit [Frankfurt]

Dated Jan 1, 1986; last modified on Sun, 26 Jan 2025

Need to develop a theoretical understanding of bullshit. An account of what bullshit is and how it differs from what it is not.

This is a common way of defining concepts in relation to others. Also saw it in the definitions of algebra, geometry and analysis as mathematical categories

Remarks on Black’s “The Prevalence of Humbug”

Humbug: deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings or attitudes.

The synonyms for humbug are quite catchy: balderdash, claptrap, hokum, drivel, buncombe, imposture, quackery.

Deceptive implies that the misrepresentation is deliberate. In that sense, the utterance and the motive are tied.

If a lie works, then the victim is twice-deceived: first of the facts, and second, of what’s in the liar’s mind.

Humbug comes with less culpability. How can the deceived prove that the liar’s thoughts were different from their utterance at the time? The plausible deniability makes humbug especially powerful.

Humbug is primarily designed to deceive the victim of what is in the speaker’s mind. A 4th of July orator declaring “our great and blessed country” is concerned less of whether the country is great or blessed, but more of whether people think of him as patriotic.

The Essence of Bullshit

Bullshit doesn’t have to be shoddy. For instance, in politics, bullshit is served with an observance to opinion polls, psychological groupings, etc.

Consequently, I’m more susceptible to bullshit that reinforces my opinions. Are there instances when I’m less critical of the assumptions made in supporting a position? #scout-mindset

Claiming that one feels as bad as a dog that’s been run over is bullshit - we can’t know what the dog feels! The essence of bullshit is the lack of concern of the truth.

Bullshit need not be false. More accurately, unlike liars and honest people, bullshitters are not constrained by the truths; instead, they don’t want the victim to know that their intention is neither to report/conceal the truth.

The phrase “post truth” became mainstream of late.

Paying no attention to the truth is a greater enemy to the truth than lying about it.

Knowing the difference between liars and bullshitters ought to save effort. If someone does not care about the truth, then debating on merits of the truth is wasted effort. Seek to know whether disagreement comes from bullshitting or conflicting mental models of the world.

Hypotheses on the Prevalence of Bullshit

Being stimulated to speak on more topics than we’re well acquainted with. A citizen in a democracy cannot possibly have opinions about every affair of the country.

We see this in political debates and congressional hearings. The presidential candidates and company execs are usually too high level to give meaningful answers. Want to know what Biden thinks of the economy? Well, let’s consult his top economists!

On second thought, it’s infeasible to interview the most knowledgeable person in Biden’s administration within the constraints of a presidential debate. Maybe a useful heuristic can be, “If the topic cannot be adequately covered within X time, then go in expecting bullshit.”

Is it more realistic to expect single-issue voters and hope that with enough voters, we’ll have a large enough group interested to vote well on each topic? Would the outcome be consistent with each voter having superficial knowledge of a lot of topics?

The idea that we can’t have reliable access to an objective reality. Individuals then seek to arrive at accurate representations of themselves rather than the common world. However, what makes us determinate, unlike everything else?

One of the funnier endings that I’ve seen in a paper: … And insofar as this is the case, sincerity itself is bullshit.

That said, while all [mental] models are wrong, aren’t some useful?

References

  1. On Bullshit. Frankfurt, Harry. Princeton University. 125.22.40.134:8080 . 1986.
  2. The Prevalence of Humbug. Black, Max. Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 13, No. 1. Cornell University. digitalcommons.brockport.edu . 1982.